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Ethics at the End of the Century: A
Mosaic form Genesis to Genetics
David H. Smith
Director, The Poynter Center
Indiana University
In the past quarter century we have seen a
surprising revival in the study of ethics in
American higher education. I want to make
several points about that revival. First, I want to
suggest why the revival occurred. Then I want to
discuss its intellectual trajectory; finally, I will say
something about the institutionalization of the
study of ethics in higher education.
I
Let's begin with some attempted
explanations. Why a renewed interest in the study
of ethics? This question is of historical interest; it
is also relevant to future planning. We must know
how we got to where we are to understand where
we may go-- or to chart our course for the future.
I call one part of the explanation cultural.
There is a widely held perception of a decline in
professional probity in medicine and law. Many
Americans are cynical about big business or
government or both. Trust in the media is at an all
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time low. Personal character and behavior seem to
be unreliable and/or hypocritical. In this situation
many people are looking for ways to mend the
world, repair the social fabric. Ethics is appealed
to in this connection and although higher
education is seen as part of the problem, it also
strikes people as a likely tool for its remediation.
These cultural forces are reinforced by
intellectual developments in the academy. Higher
education in this country started out attached to a
moral vision, and that continued through the work
of John Dewey and the Social Gospel in this
century. But the dominant mood of higher
education at midcentury was positivistic. Science
was identified with serious intellectual work; there
was enormous pressure to model all forms of
intellectual inquiry on the sciences. The main
agenda of philosophers who were concerned with
ethics was seen to be to explain how there could
be an intellectual respectable field with that name.
This was the task of metaethics.
At the end of the century the intellectual
climate has changed. Zealous partisan advocacy is
defined in some quarters as the only honest form
of intellectual exchange. Pluralism has replaced
positivism as the central descriptor of academic
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orthodoxy. Morality is so pronounced that
intellectual communication threatens to break
down over moral intolerance. Few members of
the academic community want to go back to the
chillywinds of high-positivism; fewer are satisfied
with the isolation and stagnation that occur when
serious discussion about moral disagreement is
removed from the university. Morality used to be
silly to talk about; now it's too important.
Furthermore, colleges and universities, as
others in the knowledge business, must be
concerned for ethics because knowledge effects
character. Changing the way someone
understands the world changes the person. If we
are effective teachers, we are going to have an
effect on character and the important question is
what kind of effect.
For example, colleges and universities must
stand for honesty because without it the
intellectual enterprise is impossible. And for
respect. If truth were fully known there would be
no need for universities as we know them. To be
a member of a university community is to commit
oneself to living with disagreement. But the only
thing that makes this tolerable is respect.
Furthermore, I contend that standing for these
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rigorous values is impossible without the existence
of a viable and supportive community.
Thus there is a complex set of reasons that
higher education has increasingly found itself in
the ethics business. Huge gifts have been made to
some of our national flagship institutions. A lot
has gone on at universities like Western Michigan
and Indiana. A new professional association-- the
Association for Practical and Professional Ethics--
has come into existence; readers of the Journal of
the American Medical Association of the New
En~and Journal of Medicine couldn't avoid ethics
if they wanted to; national commissions are formed
by professional associations or by governments,
companies, or communities.
II
This brings me to what I ca11ed the
"intellectual trajectory" of the field of ethics. By
the phrase "intellectual trajectory" I mean to refer
to the forms of academic work that the field of
ethics itself values and needs. I wi11start with an
attempt at a descriptive report, segueing into my
own recommendations about the direction the field
should take.
The ethics renaissance in the United States
began with the work of philosophica11y literate
21
social critics, some of whom were theologians,
some lawyers, some activities, some journalists,
some professionals. It received timely
philosophical legitimation in the work first of John
Rawls and then from others. By the mid-70s
philosophers and philosophical lawyers had largely
taken over the movement, but we have seen
another swing of the pendulum. Literary,
narrative, biographical, and case study methods
have been most recently featured. I for one
celebrate this diversity, but I want to urge special
attention to two main topics.
First a caveat. I do not think that any
other method can entirely substitute for
philosophical reflection. In particular, taken as I
am with casuistry--as will come out-- I think it
important to bear in mind that viable casuistry
must take place in a normative context. Situations
become morally interesting cases because of a set
of moral spectacles through which we see events.
These spectacles may need to be changed or
cleaned; when they are, the problem may go away
or may be made worse. Principles may need to be
revised. But we never really face the choice of
cases or principles-- situations or spectacles. We
deal with complex set of circumstances and some
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of those circumstances are the moral commitments
of players and the larger moral context in which
they play their parts.
For this reason I think it is essential that
persons who have invested their intellectual lives
in the study of "spectacles"-- of visions of the
world, moral arguments, moral sensitivity-- playa
central role in the study of the ethics. Some of
these persons will be philosophers-- in the narrow
sense of someone who holds the Ph.D. In
Philosophy. Others will be theologians, or
students of religion, or lawyers. Specialized study
of ethics is not a sufficient component of a process
of moral deliberation or perception, but it is a
necessary one.
With this in mind I offer two general
suggestions. First, ethics must work more closely
with science in the years ahead. I mean this
assertion in two rather different senses.
The first and perhaps the least
controversial of these I can illustrate with
reference to genetics. The fact is that genetics
research is creating some new problems. I
mention only two.
For one thing we now have the ability to
know the fate of some individuals far in advance of
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the time anything tangible or visible happens. We
can read the book of fate. The news may be good
or bad. For example, the child of someone with
Huntington Disease [HD] can be told at birth
whether she or he carnes the HD gene, although in
all probability the effects won't show up for
decades. This knowledge may have large
ramifications for siblings, parents, possible spouse-
- all of whom will perceive this future as part of
the child's present.
Generally, our increasing genetics
knowledge makes human interdependence
obvious; it raises questions of what should we
know and when should we know it, and of what
we owe to each other.
At the same time, most of this knowledge
will increasingly be knowledge of probabilities.
Huntington disease is untypical in this respect as
the gene is virtually 100% penetrent. If you get
the gene you get the disease. Much more typical
is the situation with the genetics of breast cancer.
People carrying the BRAe 1 gene will not be told
that they will certainly get breast cancer, but that
they have an increased probability, e.g., 78%
chance of getting it by age 50. Thus we can
expect to know many more probabilities about
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ourselves, those we love, those with whom we
work, those on whom we are dependent.
I believe the economic pressures, natural
human needs for security and happiness, as well as
intolerance for imperfection and finitude will push
application and development of this genetic
knowledge at a rapid rate. I do not fear a new
eugenics movement in the sense of the first half of
the century; I do foresee large issues of
discrimination, inequality, confusion and
unhappiness. These are issues that call for clear-
headed thought, to be sure, but they call for more
than that: for compassion ans patience and loyalty.
Ethics must be engaged with the analytical and
normative issues to be sure, but it must also
include problems of community and sensibility and
be prepared to have its agenda broadened.
Ethics also needs to work with the social
sciences, in particular with anthropology and
sociology, but explaining this will take a little
longer.
I begin with what I take to be
incontrovertible fact that good and effective as
much of the work in practical ethics has been it has
often completely failed to engage professional
workers to whom the writing is meant to be
relevant, even professionals who see the need for
refonn in professional life. Part of this is an issue
of jargon and inability effectively to write for a
nonacademic audience. That is easily remediable--
at least on principle. But another part arises when
moralists approach a life-context with a
preconceived agenda, an overly crisp sense of
what "the issues" must be. Too much professional
ethics writing betrays the fact that the author in
some very important ways doesn't know what he
or she is talking about.
This takes on methodological bite if we
recognize that professional groups usually see
themselves to be morally legitimate communities
serving high moral purposes. Obviously they often
default on this; there is always a gap between
profession and behavior. But professional ethics,
as an academic field, has not given much time to
study of the operative ethic within professional
groups, or the extent to which those ethics can
serve as a basis for serious criticism.
I became very aware if this last year when
I spent three months working in laboratories and
attending seminars in a major university's biology
department. I was struck by the interplay between
ambition and the quest for security, on the one
26
27
hand, and intellectual self-discipline, a complex
conceptual scheme and the excitement of
discovery on the other. The moral world of a
biologist ranges from routine to the flash of
insight; the moral community is complex, filled
with disappointment and death as well as
achievement. I was embarrassed to realize how
off target many of my prior conclusions or
"insights" had been.
I spent that time because I believed, and
increasingly I do believe that ethics must
rediscover ethnography, that persons hoping to do
moral criticism must spend some time immersed in
the world about which they hope to write.
Moreover this must be done in an interrogative
mode-- questioning the world one sees, and
questioning oneself There are professional risks
for moralists investing themselves in this kind of
work, but I don't see how it can be avoided if the
study of ethics is to hope to deliver on even part of
its promise.
This brings me to the second main
trajectory of work that I think needs to be done in
practical ethics: work that deals with religion and
ethics.
Although theologians and philosophers of
religion have made major contributions to
professional ethics over the years, this work is
often ignored by philosophical writers. And the
neglect may, unfortunately, sometimes be
reciprocated. There may be many reasons for this,
but one of them is the fact that philosophers have
sought a universal foundation for morality and
dismissed religious commitments as a troubling
form of particularism, rather like preference in
food or music.
This dismissal is harder to sustain if one
begins by immersing oneself in the real world of
professional practice, and that for two reasons.
First, more than one or two actual
professionals are religious in a traditional sense of
being members of some ongoing religious
community. I make no claims about the numbers
of theists in these foxholes except to say that there
are more than most philosophers or fellow-
professionals suppose. Religion is one of those
things seldom discussed in the workplace, but it is
a serious mistake to infer its absence or
irrelevance. Members of traditional religious
communities may have special difficulties relating
their identities as religious persons to their
professional roles; if they take those religious
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identities seriously, they will be the sort of morally
serious professionals to whom writing In
professional ethics should appeal.
Second, professional communities may
function as religious communities for the
professionals who work in them. The profession
may determine a professional's view of the world,
establish the calendar around which she organizes
her life, set her political agenda, and provide the
best support group a professional has.
Professional commitments tend to become total
all-encompassing commitments, and they can
become what Western theists would call
idolatrous. Seeing them in this light makes clear
how important it is to study the internal morality
of a professional community, how relevant it is to
open professional practices and institutions to
theological as well as moral critique.
Ido not mean to be calling for a religious
conversion of professionals, only to be claiming
that understanding their religion(s), engaging in
serious discussion about the role of religious
morality in the workplace, and contrasting
professional life with the standards of some
traditional religious communities are important
parts of the study of practical ethics in the next
29
few years.
III
This brings me to the last point, which
concerns institutionalization of the study of ethics.
A common model in the past decade has been the
creation of an "ethics center" to serve as a focal
point of campus work in ethics. These centers are
incredibly diverse, ranging from one started with
a 20 million dollar endowment at Princeton to ad
hoc groups offaculty on campuses large and small,
with places like Western's Center and the Poynter
Center somewhere in between. We need to think
about the strengths and weaknesses of this model
and about its long range viability.
Again I begin with a caveat. The study of
ethics in a practical mode requires more support
than can be provided by on-campus entities.
Indeed the Centers at Harvard and Princeton, to
say nothing of the Hastings Center, have major
national constituencies. The new APPE, with
which faculty here and I have been closely allied,
provides another viable form of support. But I
want to focus on local development.
And I begin with the observation that in
the vast majority of cases campuses have gotten
very good deals out of the ethics centers that they
30
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have created. Not only have they led to good
public relations, they have reinvigorated teaching,
renewed mid-career faculty, brought in external
funding, bridged gaps between the university and
external communities, and taken a substantial first
step in the direction of reestablishing campuses as
genuine communities of conversation. This is no
small achievement! It has come at a time when
higher education budgets are tight and-- I can say
as one who is grateful for significant support-- it
has come about with comparatively modest
reallocation of campus resources.
The question that has to be faced is: how
viable is this Center model over the long term?
The core of most centers is a group of one to three
people who are leading the center at the same time
they are attempting to be good citizens of their
departments and sustain an independent
professional agenda. This can only go so long,
and in any case these individuals will eventually
die, retire, or move on. Then what happens to the
campus ethics initiative? The natural university
solution to this problem is to turn the Center into
a department with its own faculty lines, courses--
and vested interests. My ambivalence about this
possibility is hard to exaggerate.
On the one hand, the genius of what has
happened at good ethics centers is identified with
their interdisciplinary character. And practical
ethics is not a discipline in the same sense as, say,
biology or philosophy understand themselves to be
disciplines. One comes into the dialogue at the
ethics center as a philosopher, theologian,
journalist or lawyer. These professional identities
are not checked at the door. Moreover, there is a
practical political advantage to non-departmental
status, as it somewhat lifts the center above the
fray of the departmental competition for funds.
And finally, one has a happily deescalated
relationship with faculty when one is not
responsible directly for their tenure, salary, course
load and the like.
On the other hand, not all departments are
made up of coherent disciplines, e.g., political
science, music, religious studies, nor is it clear that
methodological diversity IS one of their
weaknesses. Faculty working practical ethics have
diverse foci of interest; they are also commonly
concerned with an identifiable body of issues and
literature. Indeed they may have more in common
than many academic units. Nor are they really
above the fray of the budget competition.
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Most particularly, departments have
remarkable staying power. They are means of
perpetuating campus concern with a given topic or
subject matter. Thus if we think ethics is a subject
of ongoing concern to campuses, and we want that
concern to be addressed over an extended period
of time, we need to think about the question of
departmentalization including the creation of
special courses and a designated cluster offaculty.
This is scarcely an exiting point at which to
end. I have tried to say that the study of ethics
has, as the old commercial had it, come a long way
baby. Some of us have enjoyed the ride. I wanted
to claim that future work in ethics should involve
ethicist getting their hands dirty and be willing to
muck around with particularity, including the
particularity of religion. And finally I shared some
of my worries about the long term institutional
support for our field, support that will be essential
in the next 10 or 20 years. It was an honor to be
asked to share these reflections at this place which
has been such a model for what can and should be
done.
